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T
he purpose of this paper is to determine
whether Federal Reserve settlement effects
have also appeared in the overnight London
interbank offer rate (LIBOR) since the Federal
Reserve removed the reserve requirements on
Eurocurrency liabilities.1 We begin by explaining
why this is an important issue and by describing
the characteristics of these settlement effects.
The primary reason to examine this change in
reserve requirements is to determine the reach of
U.S. Federal Reserve regulatory changes. Markets
are becoming increasingly global and, accordingly,
large bank operations are becoming increasingly
global. Finding a settlement effect in LIBOR would
suggest that banks receiving U.S. deposits actively
use the London interbank loan market to manage
their domestic reserve accounts. A regular pattern
or effect in LIBOR created by a Federal Reserve rule
change would show that the impact of Fed regula-
tions is not limited to the national boundaries of
the United States. Finding a settlement effect in
LIBOR also would show that the mechanics of one
market can spill over into other markets thought to
be independent.
Since implementation of the Monetary Control
Act in 1980, most depository institutions in the
United States have been subject to the Federal
Reserve’s statutory reserve requirements. These
requirements establish the percentage of each lia-
bility category for which a bank must maintain
reserves, either as vault cash or as deposits in the
bank’s Federal Reserve account.2 (See the boxed
insert: “The Federal Reserve’s Statutory Reserve
Requirements.”) A settlement effect, referred to
above, is a regular pattern of interest rate changes
associated with the days that banks must settle their
reserve accounts with the Fed. Under rules in place
since February 1984, the primary reserve manage-
ment process calls for a biweekly settlement of
reserve accounts.3 This two-week cycle is known as
the reserve maintenance period, which begins on a
Thursday and ends two weeks later on Wednesday.
The last day of each reserve maintenance period,
called settlement Wednesday, is when banks must
settle their reserve account with the Fed. The settle-
ment rules require that, on settlement Wednesday,
a bank’s total actual reserves over the two-week
period equal or exceed its total required reserves
for that two-week period. Successfully so doing is
referred to as settling with the Fed. Banks manage
their actual reserves by trading deposits at Federal
2 Regulation D states that the reserves that depository institutions are
required to maintain are to facilitate the implementation of monetary
policy by the Federal Reserve System. However, Goodfriend and
Hargraves (1983) discuss that banks have been required to hold reserves
since 1863 and the rationale for the reserves has changed over time.
Reserves initially were required for liquidity, and this rationale was
maintained until 1931. In 1931, the liquidity rationale was replaced
by the idea that required reserves play a role in the execution of the
Fed’s credit policies. In the 1950s, Fed policy statements began shifting
toward money stock issues; in the late 1970s, M1 became the primary
intermediate policy target. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 imposed
universal reserve requirements based on the argument by the Fed that
its ability to control monetary aggregates was being weakened by
deposits moving outside the Fed’s jurisdiction; this process officially
brought us to the current rationale that required reserves are for imple-
menting monetary policy.
3 Many small banks settle their reserve position each week based on a
reserve requirement amount that is set once each quarter. However,
the vast majority of reservable deposits are held in banks that are
subject to biweekly settlement. Accordingly, studies of market pres-
sures created by reserve account management, like this study, focus
on the biweekly settlement process. 
1 The British Bankers Association (BBA) publishes daily reference rates
at various short maturities based on a survey of the major London
banks. These survey rates are referred to as LIBOR. The BBA survey
rates serve as commonly accepted benchmark rates and were crucial
to the development of the LIBOR and Eurodollar futures markets. In
fact, the BBA is described as “fixing” the benchmark rate when it pro-
vides its daily LIBOR data. The BBA has been fixing LIBOR reference
rates at various short maturities since the late 1980s but did not begin
providing an overnight LIBOR reference rate until 2001. Our data are
not BBA reference rates. Our data are the closing overnight dollar-based
cash market rates in the London interbank market, and our data source
appropriately refers to this rate series as overnight LIBOR, which is
how we refer to it in this paper. However, we remind the reader that
our data are not the rates fixed by the BBA for reference rates.
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© 2003, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.Reserve Banks among themselves in the federal
funds market. This trading over the two-week period
may create pressure in the federal funds market
and cause spikes in interest rate changes and volatil-
ity on settlement Wednesdays, which are the settle-
ment effects.
At first glance, it seems unlikely that a change
in reserve requirements on Eurocurrency liabilities
would create settlement effects in LIBOR; after all,
settlement effects are the result of banks reconciling
their reserves requirements for their domestic bank
deposits. Banks generate funds, generally in the form
of deposits, and the reserve requirements mandate
that a percentage of these funds be held in reserve.
However, not all of a bank’s funding sources are in
the form of traditional deposits and the regulations
exempt certain sources of funds from reserve
requirements. The most common source of exempt
funds for managing reserve accounts are funds
purchased through the federal funds market. Banks
are allowed to bring in funds through the federal
funds market to increase their actual reserves, and
the exemption from reserve requirements on federal
funds allows this to be done without an accompany-
ing increase in their required reserves. That is, the
reserve requirement on the liability created by the
purchase of federal funds is 0 percent. In contrast,
from 1980 until the end of 1990, Eurocurrency liabil-
ities had a reserve requirement of 3 percent4; by
1991, that requirement had become 0 percent. This
eventual exemption from reserve requirements for
Eurocurrency liabilities is what has raised the possi-
bility of a settlement effect in LIBOR: Without the 3
percent reserve requirement, reserve deposits that
are borrowed in the Eurocurrency markets for settle-
ment purposes are now essentially equivalent to
deposits borrowed in the federal funds market.
Accordingly, then, the law of one price should apply
and drive the rates in these markets together.5 (We
show this in Table 1.) However, for settlement effects
to appear in LIBOR, banks subject to U.S. Federal
Reserve settlement regulations must be using Euro-
currency liabilities to manage their reserve
accounts actively enough to affect LIBOR on settle-
ment Wednesdays. The federal funds trading desk
manager of a major U.S. bank confirms that banks
began managing their reserve accounts with
Eurocurrency liabilities after the reduction in their
reserve requirement. So, if banks are now using
these liabilities to manage their reserve accounts,
our question is: Are settlement pressures pervasive
enough to reach overseas to create settlement
effects in LIBOR?
We use closing overnight dollar-based LIBOR to
test for a settlement Wednesday effect in the Euro-
dollar market because LIBOR is the rate that major
London banks offer for Eurocurrency liabilities to
other banks. For the pre-1991 period, when Euro-
currency liabilities were subject to a 3 percent
reserve requirement, we do not find any settlement
effects in overnight LIBOR. We do find settlement
effects concurrent with the change to the 0 percent
28 MARCH/APRIL 2003
5 We expect minor risk differences between the Eurocurrency markets
and the federal funds market, so the law of one price will not hold
exactly. For example, even with a 0 percent reserve requirement,
Eurocurrency liabilities are a reservable liability of the bank and
hence may affect the marginal reserve requirement on other liabilities
as well as the required frequency of deposit reporting and reserve
settlement. However, without a reserve requirement on Euro-market
U.S. dollars, the rates in the two markets should be close enough to
allow Euro-market U.S. dollars to be a viable source of funds for bank
settlement.
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Spreads Over 3-Month T-bills
Federal funds  Overnight government repo  LIBOR spread 
(basis points) spread  (basis points) spread  (basis points) 
Time period relative to 3-month T-bills relative to 3-month T-bills relative to 3-month T-bills
8/4/86 through 1/31/95 45 (43) 47 (43) 55 (51)
2/7/91 through 1/31/95 6 (4) 16 (14) 15 (14)
NOTE: Numbers provided here are mean spreads; numbers in parentheses are median spreads.
Table 1
4 An amendment to Regulation D changed the reserve requirement on
Eurocurrency liabilities: From August 1980 through the reserve mainte-
nance period ending December 12, 1990, the requirement was 3
percent; for the one reserve maintenance period from December 13
through December 26, 1990, the requirement was 1.5 percent; as of
December 27, 1990, the requirement was changed to its current 0
percent.reserve requirement. In related work, Griffiths and
Winters (1997) found settlement effects in closing
federal funds rates and closing overnight govern-
ment repurchase agreements (repo) rates. Thus, we
test closing federal funds rates and closing overnight
government repo rates for settlement effects during
both periods—when Eurocurrency liabilities carried
a 3 percent reserve requirement and after the reserve
requirement was reduced to zero. We find settlement
effects in federal funds rates during both periods,
which suggests that a settlement effect in LIBOR
only when the reserve requirement is 0 percent is
a direct result of the reduction in that reserve require-
ment. Our results suggest the following: (i) Federal
Reserve policies are sufficiently pervasive to have
global effects and (ii) the effects of the federal funds
market microstructure for U.S. depository institu-
tions spill over into other markets. 
In the next section, we discuss the existing theo-
retical and empirical literature on the rate change
and variance patterns unique to reserve account
settlement with the U.S. Federal Reserve, as well as
the relevant institutional details for U.S. reserve
account management related to federal funds trading
and the relationship between LIBOR and British
bank settlement. We then present the data and
methods and finally our test results.
INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS
In this section, we provide various institutional
details as background on the different markets. We
begin with a brief history of the Eurodollar market
and discuss the bank settlement procedures in the
United States and the United Kingdom. We also
discuss the existing theoretical and empirical litera-
ture on the rate change and variance patterns unique
to the reserve account settlement process with the
Federal Reserve.
A Brief History of the Eurodollar Market
We begin this section with a brief history of the
Eurodollar market, which may be unfamiliar to
some readers. We draw our discussion from Stigum
(1990, Chap. 7, pp. 207-11).
Prior to World War II, it was not uncommon
for banks outside the United States to take dollar
deposits, but there was little volume in this market
and the market had little economic significance.
During the 1950s, things began to change as the
cold war between the United States and communist
countries intensified. Specifically, Soviet businesses
needed U.S. dollars for trade but were concerned
about holding their dollar deposits in U.S. banks; so,
they moved their dollar deposits to banks outside
of the United States. This scenario contributed to
the birth of the modern Eurodollar market.
Historically, the British pound sterling was the
leading currency for international trade. However,
following World War II the British ran large balance
of payments deficits, so a constant threat of devalu-
ation of the pound sterling existed. In addition, the
British restricted the use of the pound sterling in
financing international trade, so international trade
moved toward the U.S. dollar.
As the Eurodollar market began to grow, U.S.
banks were reluctant participants. In fact, Stigum
describes their entry into the market as “defensive.”
However, the interest rate restrictions under Regula-
tion Q forced U.S. banks to play in the Eurodollar
market when depositors could get better rates out-
side the United States. Also, during the 1960s the
United States tried to improve its balance of pay-
ments deficits by imposing capital constraints that
limited the flow of dollars from U.S. banks to foreign
borrowers, which created demand for Eurodollar
loans.
Stigum notes that the above factors were signifi-
cant contributors to the growth of the Eurodollar
market, but that dollar depositors both in and out
of the United States have the ability to place their
deposits both in and out of the United States; so,
where the dollar deposits go depends on the relative
attractiveness of the deposit. Currently, the relative
attractiveness of Eurodollar deposits is that they
are, in particular, free of Federal Reserve statutory
reserve requirements.
Federal Reserve Bank Settlement and
the Federal Funds Market Literature
Since 1980, most depository institutions in the
United States have been subject to the Federal
Reserve’s statutory reserve requirements. To enforce
these requirements, since February 1984, the Fed
has compared each bank’s actual and required
reserves during a 14-day reserve maintenance
period. (For details, see the boxed insert.) Reserve
maintenance periods begin every other Thursday
and end on Wednesday 14 days later (“settlement
Wednesday”). A maintenance period typically has
10 trading days.
A bank satisfies its statutory reserve requirement
by holding an adequate amount of eligible vault
cash and/or deposits at Federal Reserve Banks; no
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The Monetary Control Act of 1980 governs
statutory reserve requirements in the United States.
The act, implemented in November 1980 through
the Federal Reserve’s Regulation D (12 CFR 204),
imposes federal statutory reserve requirements on
all U.S. chartered federally insured depositories
(including their Edge and agreement corporation
subsidiaries) and on branches and agencies of
foreign banks if the parent firm’s consolidated
worldwide assets exceed $1 billion or if the branch
or agency is eligible to apply for federal deposit
insurance.1 Within broad limits, the act delegates
the setting of specific reserve-requirement ratios
to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.2
The act imposes statutory reserve requirements
on three classes of depository institutions’ liabili-
ties: net transaction deposits, nonpersonal time
(including savings) deposits, and net Eurocurrency
liabilities. If any of the net amounts are negative, the
amount for reserve-requirement purposes is zero.
• Net transaction deposits: A transaction
account is defined as “a deposit or account
on which a depositor or account holder is
permitted to make withdrawals by nego-
tiable or transferable instrument, payment
orders of withdrawal, telephone transfers,
or similar devices for the purpose of making
payments or transfers to third persons or
others.” A depository’s net transaction
deposits were defined, if positive, to be total
transaction deposits minus the sum of cash
items in process of collection and balances
held at other depository institutions that
could be immediately withdrawn.
• Nonpersonal time deposits: Time deposits
(including savings deposits, which are
regarded as time deposits without a specific
maturity date) are defined, generally speak-
ing, to be all deposits that are not transaction
deposits. A nonpersonal deposit is a deposit
in which the beneficial interest is held by
other than a natural person; a natural person
is an individual or sole proprietorship.
• Eurocurrency liabilities: Eurocurrency
liabilities are the sum of net borrowing by
domestic banking offices from foreign
offices plus certain assets sold by domestic
banking offices to foreign offices. (For
reserve requirement purposes, the sale of
the asset to a foreign office is treated as a
dollar-for-dollar reduction in the reservable
deposits of the domestic office.) Specifically,
Regulation D specifies that Eurocurrency
liabilities include the following:
a. For a depository institution or an Edge
or agreement corporation organized
under the laws of the United States, the
sum of the following transactions of U.S.
offices with related offices outside the
United States3:
° Net balances due to a depository’s
non-U.S. offices and its international
banking facilities (IBF) from its U.S.
offices;
° Assets (including participations)
acquired from its U.S. offices and held
by its non-U.S. offices, by its IBF, or by
non-U.S. offices of an affiliated Edge
or agreement corporation; and, for
Edge and agreement corporations,
assets acquired from its U.S. offices
and held by non-U.S. offices of its U.S.
or foreign parent institution, its IBF, or
by non-U.S. offices of an affiliated
Edge or agreement corporation; and 
° Credit outstanding from a depository
institution’s non-U.S. offices to U.S.
residents (other than assets acquired
and net balances due from its U.S.
offices), except credit extended (i) from
Continued on p. 31
1 This text is a general summary. Various provisions and applications
of Regulation D have changed through time. At the time of this
writing, the current version of Regulation D was available at <http://
www.federalreserve.gov/regulations/title12/sec204/12cfr204_01.htm>.
Specific legal definitions are contained in Regulation D and its staff
interpretations. The citation 12 CFR 204 refers to section 204 of
Chap. 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
2 Limits in the legislation include a reserve requirement range of 0 to 9
percent on time deposits (including savings deposits) and 8 to 14
percent on net transaction deposits.
3 For definitions and discussion of Edge corporations, agreement
corporations, and international banking facilities, see Marcia Stigum’s
The Money Market (1990, 3rd ed., Chaps. 6 and 7).MARCH/APRIL 2003      31
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its non-U.S. offices in the aggregate
amount of $100,000 or less to any U.S.
resident; (ii) by a non-U.S. office that
at no time during the computation
period had credit outstanding to U.S.
residents exceeding $1 million; (iii) to
an international banking facility; or
(iv) to an institution that will be main-
taining reserves on such credit pur-
suant. Credit extended from non-U.S.
offices or from an IBF to a foreign
branch, office, subsidiary, affiliate of
other foreign establishment (foreign
affiliate) controlled by one or more
domestic corporations is not regarded
as credit extended to a U.S. resident if
the proceeds will be used to finance
the operations outside the United States
of the borrower or of other foreign
affiliates of the controlling domestic
corporation(s). 
b. For a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign
bank, the sum of the following: 
° Net balances due to its foreign bank
and its IBF after deducting an amount
equal to 8 percent of the following:
the U.S. branch or agency’s total
assets less the sum of (i) cash items in
process of collection; (ii) unposted
debits; (iii) demand balances due from
depository institutions organized
under the laws of the United States
and from other foreign banks; (iv) bal-
ances due from foreign central banks;
and (v) positive net balances due from
its IBF, its foreign bank, and the foreign
bank’s U. S. and non-U. S. offices;
and, 
° Assets (including participations)
acquired from the U.S. branch or
agency (other than assets required to
be sold by federal or state supervisory
authorities) and held by its foreign
bank (including offices thereof located
outside the United States), by its parent
holding company, by non-U.S. offices
or an IBF of an affiliated Edge or agree-
ment corporation, or by its IBFs.
Reserve Settlement with the Federal
Reserve
The accounting rules that govern a depository
institution’s reserve settlement with the Federal
Reserve depend on the specific circumstances of
the bank.4 Generally, settlement rules differ across
banks with respect to (i) whether during the pre-
vious reserve maintenance period the bank had a
deficiency (actual reserves less than required) or
surplus (actual reserves more than required) and
(ii) whether the bank had a clearing balance con-
tract with the Federal Reserve.5
Prior to 1990, relatively few banks had clearing
balance contracts with the Federal Reserve and,
hence, the settlement rules applicable to most
banks were those for depository institutions with-
out clearing balance contracts. Within those rules,
one of the more important is that a bank may
carry a deficiency or surplus forward only once,
to the next maintenance period. If a deficiency is
not fully offset by holding additional reserves dur-
ing the next period, the bank may be subject to a
monetary penalty (charged at the discount rate in
effect as of the beginning of that month plus 2 
Continued on p. 32
4 The Federal Reserve’s settlement rules use the concepts of a “reserve
maintenance period” and a “reserve computation period.” The
reserve maintenance period is the interval (14 days in duration as of
February 1984 and 7 days in duration prior to February 1984) during
which the institution must hold enough deposits at the Federal
Reserve to satisfy its reserve requirement after subtracting from its
requirement the amount of its vault cash that is eligible to satisfy
the requirement. The amount of a depository institution’s reserve
requirement is calculated from its liabilities during the reserve
computation period. For more specific definitions and examples,
see the Federal Reserve’s Reserve Maintenance Manual at <http://
www.frbservices.org/Accounting/CustomerReferenceGuide.cfm>.
5 Clearing balance contracts are discussed in chapters 8 and 11 of
the Reserve Maintenance Manual. See also E.J. Stevens, “Required
Clearing Balances,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic
Review, December 1993, p. 2-14, and J.N. Feinman, “Reserve Require-
ments: History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin, June 1993, pp. 569-89. Note that the older term
“required clearing balance” has been replaced by the term “clearing
balance requirement” in more recent Federal Reserve publications.
This seems fully appropriate because, unless a bank has a history
of excessive overnight and/or daylight overdrafts at the Federal
Reserve, clearing balance requirements are a voluntary commitment
by a bank to maintain deposits at the Fed above and beyond those
required to satisfy mandatory statutory reserve requirements. In
exchange for maintaining the additional deposits, the bank receives
earnings credits that can be used to defray the cost of financial
services (such as check clearing) purchased from the Fed. Prior to
December 1990, few larger banks had clearing balance contracts;
this changed sharply after the December 1990 reduction in reserve
requirements. (See, for example, Feinman, Figure 9, p. 583.)32 MARCH/APRIL 2003
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percentage points, at an annual rate). Conversely,
if a surplus is not fully utilized to satisfy require-
ments during that next period, it is lost. This rule
does not prohibit a bank from carrying forward a
deficiency or surplus from one maintenance
period to the next—but it does prohibit carrying
forward the same deficiency or excess.6 The rules
limit the maximum amount (deficiency or surplus)
that can be carried forward from a reserve mainte-
nance period into the next to the greater of 4 per-
cent of the bank’s required reserves or $50,000.7
Banks whose actual reserves repeatedly fall short
of required reserves may receive, in addition to
monetary penalties, admonitions or “counseling”
from the Fed. 
Beginning in 1991, the somewhat different
settlement rules that apply to depository institu-
tions with clearing balance contracts are important.
Following the December 1990 and April 1992
reductions in reserve requirements, many larger
banks entered, for the first time, into clearing bal-
ance contracts with the Fed.8 Between December
1990 and December 1992, for example, the aggre-
gate amount of clearing balance contracts increased
from $2 billion to $6 billion. Settlement rules for
such banks are more complex than those for banks
without clearing balance contracts because a
depository institution might incur a deficiency or
surplus with respect to its clearing balance require-
ment, its statutory reserve requirement, or both.
Settlement is somewhat less onerous, however,
because the clearing balance requirement provides
a cushion for the bank with respect to satisfying its
statutory reserve requirement.9 Under the Federal
Reserve’s accounting rules, settlement begins, first,
by subtracting eligible vault cash from the deposi-
tory’s statutory reserve requirement.10 Next, the
remaining portion of the statutory requirement is
subtracted from the amount of deposits held at
the Fed. Finally, the remaining amount of deposits
held at the Fed is compared with the clearing bal-
ance requirement. Because of the sequencing of
these operations, banks with clearing balance
requirements are highly unlikely to be deficient
with respect to their statutory reserve requirement.
Further, the clearing balance requirement is said
to be satisfied if the bank is within $25,000 or 2
percent (above or below) of the required amount. 
As noted before, a deficiency or surplus can
be carried forward into the next maintenance
period but the same deficiency or surplus cannot
be carried forward to a subsequent period. The
maximum deficiency or surplus that may be carried
forward is equal to the greater of 4 percent of the
sum of the bank’s statutory reserve requirement
plus its clearing balance requirement or $50,000,
minus the clearing balance allowance (the greater
of $25,000 or 2 percent of the clearing balance
requirement).11
—Richard G. Anderson
6 For specific examples on deficiencies, see Reserve Maintenance
Manual, Table 2, examples “D” and “F,” p. XI-5; on surpluses, see
Reserve Maintenance Manual, Table 1, examples “D” and “E,” p. XI-2.
7 Prior to September 1992, the carryover was the greater of (i) 2 per-
cent of required reserves plus the clearing balance requirement or
(ii) $25,000.
8 In December 1990, the reserve requirement ratios on nonpersonal
time deposits and Eurocurrency liabilities were reduced to zero. In
April 1992, the marginal reserve requirement ratio on net transaction
deposits was reduced to 10 percent from 12 percent. For a detailed
discussion and examples of the reserve settlement rules applicable
to banks with clearing balance requirements, see Reserve Maintenance
Manual, chapter XII.
9 These aspects are compared by Feinman (1993).
10 The eligibility of vault cash has changed through time. Prior to 1917,
all vault cash held during the reserve maintenance period was eligible.
From 1917 to 1959, no vault cash was eligible. Between December
1959 and December 1960, vault cash eligibility was phased in on a
pro rata monthly scale. Beginning in September 1968, eligible vault
cash was the amount held during the 7-day period that ended 14 days
prior to the end of a 7-day reserve maintenance period. Beginning
February 1984, eligible vault cash was the amount held during the
14-day period ending 31 days prior to the end of a 14-day mainte-
nance period. Beginning November 1992, eligible vault cash was
the amount held during the 14-day period ending 17 days prior to
the end of a 14-day reserve maintenance period. Since July 1998,
eligible vault cash has been the amount held during the 14-day period
ending 45 days before the end of the reserve maintenance period.
11 For details, see chapter IX of the Reserve Maintenance Manual.other assets may be used. The eligibility of vault
cash has varied through time. During the first part
of our sample period (prior to September 1992),
eligible vault cash was the average amount held by
the bank during a 14-day period ending 31 days
before the end of the maintenance period. During
the latter part of our sample (beginning September
1992), it was the average amount held during a 14-
day period ending 17 days before the end of the
maintenance period. At the close of the maintenance
period, eligible vault cash is subtracted from the
bank’s required reserves. The remainder is subtracted
from the average daily amount of deposits held by
the bank at the Federal Reserve. If the result is neg-
ative, the bank is deficient. If positive, the bank has
a surplus. Prior to September 1992, a bank could
carry over into the next maintenance period, with-
out penalty, a deficiency or surplus equal to the
greater of (i) 2 percent of the sum of its required
reserves plus its clearing balance requirement or
(ii) $25,000. (Again, see the boxed insert for details.)
In September 1992, this was increased to the greater
of 4 percent or $50,000.6 Federal Reserve rules
require that a penalty be assessed if a deficiency is
not offset by reserve holdings during the subsequent
maintenance period. Although the rules prohibit
carrying forward the same deficiency into a subse-
quent (third) period, a bank may carry forward a
new deficiency. That is, a bank’s reserves during
the current maintenance period may be sufficient
to fully satisfy a previous period’s deficiency that
has been carried forward but, at the same time,
inadequate to avoid carrying forward a new defi-
ciency based on its required reserves for the current
maintenance period. A surplus carried forward,
but not used to satisfy required reserves, expires
unused.
Theoretical and empirical studies have described
the unique rate change and variance patterns created
by the settlement rules. Table 2 provides a cross-
reference between the theoretical predictions and
the empirical results from the settlement rules. 
Griffiths and Winters (1995) provide a model of
federal funds rate pressures based on the Federal
Reserve settlement rules. Their model provides daily
rate pressure predictions across the two-week
reserve maintenance period. The daily predictions
(Table 2, column 1 of panel A) are as follows:
• rates are expected to decline on Fridays in
advance of the weekend,
• rates are expected to decline on the second
Tuesday (the day before settlement), and
• rates are expected to rise on the second (settle-
ment) Wednesday.
The predicted rate pressures should create
additional daily empirical rate changes when the
predicted daily pressures abate. We present the
predicted empirical pattern in column 2 of panel A
in Table 2. The additional rate changes not described
in Griffiths and Winters are the rebound effects that
follow from the abatement of the rate pressures
predicted in their model. Specifically, one would
expect to find the following rebound effects:
• rates are expected to rise on Mondays follow-
ing the abatement of lending pressure on
Fridays, and
• rates are expected to decline on the first
Thursday (the first day of the reserve main-
tenance period) following the abatement 
of the borrowing pressure on settlement
Wednesday of the previous reserve mainte-
nance period.
The empirical literature shows strong support
for the rate pressures predicted by Griffiths and
Winters (1995). Specifically, declining rates on
Fridays and rising rates on settlement Wednesday
appear in all five papers presented in panel A. Also,
three of the five papers show declining rates on the
second Tuesday. In addition, all five papers show
the expected rebound effect on the first Monday
and four of five papers show the expected rebound
on the second Monday. There is not a consistent
rebound effect on the first Thursday.
Griffiths and Winters (1995) do not predict
specific rate pressures on the first Tuesday, the first
Wednesday, or the second Thursday. However, they
do identify a general preference for selling over
purchasing federal funds across a reserve mainte-
nance period, which suggests declining rates in the
absence of any specific rate pressures. The five
papers cited show a tendency for rates to decline
on the first Tuesday and the first Wednesday and
for no rate change on the second Thursday.
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6 The purpose of the increase in carryover to 4 percent from 2 percent
was to make successful settlement easier for banks. Griffiths and
Winters (2000) examine the size of the settlement effects in closing
federal funds and overnight government repo rates around this regu-
lation change. They find no reduction in the identified settlement
effects after the increase in the allowable range. With strong empirical support for the rate
change pattern predicted by Griffiths and Winters
(1995) the question becomes: What pattern of rate
changes is necessary to identify a settlement effect
in a substitute funding source for reserve account
management? Griffiths and Winters (1997) suggest
that the rate change that is unique to the U.S. settle-
ment process is the rate increase on settlement
Wednesdays. They argue that any entity with non-
earning cash on Fridays (not just banks with deposits
at the Federal Reserve) will have an incentive to lend
(invest) on Fridays to avoid leaving the funds idle
over the weekend. Thus, rates across money market
instruments (domestic and foreign) should decline
as non-earning cash is moved into investment vehi-
cles for the weekend.7 Then, following the weekend,
rates should rebound on Monday. Gibbons and Hess
(1981) find negative returns on T-bills on Mondays
and positive returns on T-bills on Wednesdays,
reflecting a T-bill yield increase on Mondays and
decrease on Wednesdays. Thus, the rate increases
that occur on Mondays, cited in Table 2, panel A,
are not unique to the U.S. settlement process. In
addition, the general tendency for rates to decline
on the first Wednesday of the reserve maintenance
period is not unique to the U.S. settlement process.
Accordingly, the only consistent daily rate change
shown in the cited papers that is unique to the U.S.
settlement process is the rate increase on settlement
Wednesday.
Up to this point, we have described the daily rate
changes created by reserve account management
for successful settlement. However, rate changes
are only part of the picture because the settlement
rules also create a predictable pattern in daily and
intraday variances. Panel B of Table 2 summarizes
the predicted daily variance pattern and some of
the empirical work on variances related to the settle-
ment process. 
Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) provide a model
for daily and intraday federal funds rate variance
based on the U.S. settlement rules. The predictions
from their model (Table 2, column 1 of panel B) are
as follows:
• daily variances are expected to increase on
Fridays because positions must be taken on
Friday to cover reserve requirements for
Saturday and Sunday;
• daily variances are expected to increase as
settlement approaches, with the largest daily
variance on settlement Wednesday; and
• intraday variances are expected to increase
as the close of the business day approaches.
Spindt and Hoffmeister focus on variances during
a reserve maintenance period. Thus, their variance
predictions do not include the effect of the transition
from one reserve maintenance period to the next.
We expect to see an empirically large variance on
the first Thursday of the reserve maintenance period
following the abatement of the settlement pressures
from the preceding day.
The last five columns of Table 2, panel B, repro-
duce some empirical results on variances across a
reserve maintenance period to highlight the impor-
tance of both the pattern and the magnitude of the
variances. Columns 3 through 5 are reproduced from
Table 4 in Griffiths and Winters (1995). Column 3
shows that daily variances increase on Fridays and
as settlement approaches, with the variance on
settlement Wednesday being by far the largest.
Columns 4 and 5 provide variance estimates for the
morning and afternoon on each day of the reserve
maintenance period. The day-to-day patterns in the
morning and afternoon are generally consistent
with the daily pattern. In addition, the afternoon
variance is larger than the morning variance for
each day of the reserve maintenance period, as
predicted by Spindt and Hoffmeister. Columns 6
and 7 of panel B in Table 2 are reproduced from
Griffiths and Winters (1997). These daily variances
are calculated using closing federal funds and over-
night general collateral government repo rates.
These variance results show that daily variances
increase as settlement approaches, with the addition
of a large variance in the first Thursday. In the federal
funds market, the variance on settlement Wednesday
is the largest daily variance; in repos, settlement
Wednesday is large relative to the daily variances
from the middle of the reserve maintenance period
but is the second-largest daily variance. Accordingly,
the empirical results on variances provide support
for the predicted variance patterns across the
reserve maintenance period and suggest that the
general pattern in daily variances created by the
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7 Griffiths and Winters (1997) find that rates decline on Fridays in both
government repos and Government National Mortgage Association
(GMNA) repos. A review of the literature finds no day-of-the-week
studies in commercial paper, negotiable CDs, bankers’ acceptances,
or Eurodollar deposits, so we are unable to provide additional support
for declining rates on Fridays being a common occurrence across
private-issue money market instruments. Because the issue of declin-
ing rates across private-issue money market instruments is outside
the focus of this paper, we leave this issue for further research. MARCH/APRIL 2003      35
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Patterns in Rate Changes and Variances Related to Federal Reserve Settlement Rules
A: Daily Rate Changes
Expected Daily  Daily  Closing  Closing  Intraday








1st Thursday None – – + NS NS NS
1st Friday –––––––
1st Monday None ++++++
1st Tuesday None None – – – NS –
1st Wednesday None None – – NS – –
2nd Thursday None None NS NS + NS NS
2nd Friday –––––––
2nd Monday None + NS + + + +
2nd Tuesday – – NS – – NS –
2nd Wednesday +++++++
B: Daily and Intraday Variances
Expected Daily Morning  Afternoon  Closing Closing 








1st Thursday None + 124  31 94 3.003 2.286
1st Friday + + 238 88 136  1.387 1.004
1st Monday None None 112 42 57 2.398 1.004
1st Tuesday None None 143 15 98  2.422 1.451
1st Wednesday None None 164 21 86 1.483 1.059
2nd Thursday None None 194 70 75 1.831 1.058
2nd Friday + + 310 73 164 1.842 1.225
2nd Monday + + 245 71 114 3.992 2.679
2nd Tuesday + + 1795 43 1587 3.171 1.792
2nd Wednesday + + 4029 249 3031 5.717 2.543
NOTE: This table provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the daily rate change pattern in the overnight federal funds rates
and overnight general collateral repo rates. NS is an insignificant parameter estimate; None is either no prediction or no expectation.
aGriffiths and Winters (1995) provide a model that predicts specific daily rate changes in the federal funds market and provides empirical
support for the predication using daily high and low federal funds rates.
bHamilton (1996) examines daily rate changes and variance in a GARCH model using the daily average (effective) federal funds rate.
cGriffiths and Winters (1997) examine daily rate changes in the primary funding source (federal funds) and a substitute funding source
(overnight general collateral repos) using daily closing rates.
dCyree and Winters (2001) examine daily rate changes in a GARCH model using hourly federal funds rates.
eSpindt and Hoffmeister (1988) model the federal funds market. The model provides predictions for daily and intraday patterns in federal
funds rate variances. We provide the daily pattern in this table and note that the intraday prediction is for variance to increase in the
afternoon.
fGriffiths and Winters (1995) use high and low rates to estimate daily and intraday variances, and their estimates (reproduced here)
support the predictions from Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988). We provide the Griffiths and Winters point estimates because the magnitude
of the variance estimates is important.
gGriffiths and Winters (1997) use closing federal funds rates and closing overnight general collateral government repo rates to esti-
mate the daily variance pattern in the primary (federal funds) and a secondary (government repos) funding source for management
of Federal Reserve accounts for settlement.
Table 2settlement rules spills over into the variances of
substitute funding sources.8
We note that Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988)
and Griffiths and Winters (1995) model bank reserve
account management in the absence of Federal
Reserve open market activity to manage interest
rates. Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2000 and 2001)
extend the previous models by incorporating Fed
market intervention into a model of bank behavior
during reserve maintenance periods. The Bartolini,
Bertola, and Prati (2001) model suggests that patterns
in interest rate volatility should reflect the market’s
confidence in the Fed’s commitment to rate target-
ing. They suggest that the Fed’s move in 1994 toward
more transparency in rate targeting and a tendency
to change target rates only at FOMC meetings should
give the market more confidence in the Fed’s com-
mitment to rate targeting. They suggest that, since
1994, less federal funds rate volatility across main-
tenance periods and as settlement approaches
provides support for their model. We note that the
patterns found by Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2001)
are consistent with the literature cited above. How-
ever, it has been widely understood that the Fed has
been targeting interest rates since the mid-1980s
(see Thornton 1988 and 2002), so the patterns
identified in the literature cited in Table 2 occurred
during a period when the market understood that
the Fed was managing interest rates and occurred
despite the Fed’s active efforts to manage interest
rates.
In summary, the daily rate changes and vari-
ances that are unique to the U.S. settlement process
are the biweekly rate increase and the variance
increase on settlement Wednesdays. Accordingly,
we focus on settlement Wednesdays to determine
whether the effect of U.S. settlement rules reach
overseas when Eurocurrency liabilities become a
substitute funding source for reserve account
management. However, before we can test for a
biweekly settlement Wednesday effect, we must
determine whether British banking regulations
create any daily rate change or variance patterns
that would appear biweekly on U.S. settlement
Wednesdays. 
British Bank Settlement and LIBOR
LIBOR is the rate that major London banks offer
to other banks on short-term funds. Thus, in the over-
night market, LIBOR-based trades are similar to
federal funds trades as banks make one-day trades
of funds. Given the similarities in the trades in the
overnight federal funds and overnight LIBOR-based
markets, when the Fed reduced the reserve require-
ment on Eurocurrency liabilities to 0 percent, the
overnight Eurodollar market became a viable sub-
stitute for the federal funds market as a source of
deposits at the Fed for bank settlement. If the LIBOR-
based market acts as a substitute, we would expect
to see the settlement Wednesday effect spillover
into LIBOR. However, before we can test LIBOR for
U.S. Federal Reserve settlement effects, we must
understand the settlement rules under which the
London banks operate.
Settlement or clearing banks are required to
keep small amounts of cash on deposit with the
Bank of England. The deposits are not for monetary
policy objectives or for clearing, but, instead, are
intended to cover central bank operating costs. Each
bank must cover its required reserves on a daily
basis. With this daily settlement, the central bank
intervenes in the market several times each day to
ensure adequate liquidity.9 Given daily settlement,
the U.K. settlement process will not cause day-of-
the-week regularities in rate changes and variances.
Accordingly, we are able to test overnight LIBOR
rates for U.S. settlement effects.
Swanson (1988), Fung and Isberg (1992), and
Mougoue and Wagster (1997) examine the causality
between three-month domestic CD rates and three-
month Eurodollar rates and achieve mixed results
on the direction of the causality. In this paper, we
have a specific expectation on causality: In the
absence of confounding effects in the British bank-
ing regulations, we expect that U.S. overnight market
behavior resulting from Federal Reserve settlement
rules will create the appearance of settlement effects
in overnight LIBOR after the change to a 0 percent
reserve requirement on Eurocurrency liabilities.
36 MARCH/APRIL 2003
Cyree, Griffiths, Winters R EVIEW
8 The only assets that are acceptable as reserves are vault cash and
deposits at the Fed. Many possible sources can provide cash or Fed
deposits, and (historically) most of these sources of funds alter a bank’s
required reserves. Accordingly, a substitute for federal funds is a funding
source that does not alter required reserves or, in other words, has a
0 percent reserve requirement.
9 The Bank of England conducts its daily trading at noon and 2:30 p.m.
The Bank may also trade at 9:45 a.m. if it forecasts a large shortage
for the day. The Bank stands ready to intervene for settlement banks
only at 3:50 p.m. to provide the necessary end-of-the-day liquidity.
The multiple daily interventions by the Bank of England create interest-
ing intraday research opportunities. However, we have access only to
daily closing overnight LIBOR rates and thus leave the intraday ques-
tions for further research.DATA AND METHODS
Data
For this paper, we use daily closing data for (i)
federal funds rates, (ii) overnight general-collateral
government repo rates, and (iii) overnight LIBOR.
LIBOR coincides with the London close while the
other rates reflect the New York close. Since London
time is typically five hours ahead of New York time,
the London close occurs late morning New York
time. Accordingly, overnight LIBOR established at
the close in London is established during the late
morning in New York. We also use three-month T-bill
yields as a proxy for the general level of short-term
interest rates. To control properly for contempora-
neous changes in short-term interest rates and thus
isolate the daily settlement effects, we must account
for the time difference between London and New
York in our application of T-bill annualized yields.
Accordingly, we use the U.S. closing T-bill yields in
our tests on federal funds rates and on overnight
general-collateral government repo rates, and we
use 11:00 a.m. (Eastern time) T-bill yields in our tests
on overnight LIBOR.
The sample period covers August 4, 1986,
through January 31, 1995. The beginning of the
sample period coincides with the first available date
for the overnight LIBOR rates. Ending the sample
on January 31, 1995, stops the sample period before
the majority of U.S. banks began actively using
retail-deposit sweep programs. Active use of such
sweep programs altered the reserve positions of
U.S. banks to a point where Anderson and Rasche
(2001) describe the reserve requirements for most
banks as “voluntary constraints.” Thus, the active
use of sweep programs likely altered the reserve
account management behavior of most banks. We
end our sample at January 31, 1995, to avoid any
possible change in reserve account management
from the active use of retail-deposit sweep programs.
Also, ending the sample period at this time provides
approximately four years of data before and after
the reserve reduction on Eurocurrency liabilities.
The entire sample period coincides with the two-
week reserve maintenance period used by the
Federal Reserve.10 The data on federal funds, over-
night repos, and three-month T-bills were collected
from the daily logs of the International Monetary
Market (IMM) division of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. The IMM acquires the data from Telerate,
and our overnight LIBOR data were purchased from
Knight-Ridder, Inc.
Methods
Griffiths and Winters (1997) test for settlement
rate-change effects in overnight government repos
in a three-equation SUR model (seemingly unrelated
regression) with dependent variables for government
repos, federal funds, and GNMA repos. The basic
equation in their SUR model was
(1)
where Spdt is the change in the spread of an over-
night rate (government repos, federal funds, GNMA
repos) for day t (Spdt–Spdt–1) relative to three-month
T-bill yields11; Dik is a 0/1 dummy variable with i
representing the first or second week of the reserve
maintenance period and k representing the specific
day of the week; and TBt is the change in the three-
month T-bill yield for day t (yieldt–yieldt–1). The
change in T-bill yields is included in the model to
control for changes in the general level of short-
term interest rates.
The benefit of the SUR model is that it allows
us to test for differences in parameter estimates
across equations. The limitation of the SUR model
in testing for settlement effects is that it does not
allow us to incorporate the known daily hetero-
skedasticity in the federal funds market. Accordingly,
Griffiths and Winters separately test daily variances
with the following equation:
(2)
where Vart is the square of the daily spread change.
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10 The Federal Reserve switched from a one-week reserve maintenance
period to a two-week reserve maintenance period for the maintenance
period beginning on February 2, 1984. From that date to the present,
the Fed has used a two-week maintenance period.
11 Griffiths and Winters (1997) note that standard conventions suggest
that the change in spread be specified as the log relative [ln(Spdt/
Spdt–1)] or as the percent change [(Spdt–Spdt–1)/Spdt–1]. However,
the spread between overnight instruments and three-month T-bills is
negative at several points during their sample period. A negative spread
precludes using the standard conventions, and thus they use the first
difference in daily spreads to calculate spread changes. We also have
negative spreads at various times, and, therefore, we also use the first
difference in daily spreads.
,The presence of heteroskedastic daily vari-
ances suggests the need for a G/ARCH (general/
autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic) model
that allows for the estimation of returns and con-
ditional variance simultaneously.12 Such a model
allows for the explicit inclusion of heteroskedastic-
ity in the estimation process, which improves the
model’s standard errors and thus the t statistics. How-
ever, a GARCH estimation precludes the direct test-
ing of differences in parameter estimates between
equations that can be done in an SUR model. So, to
test for settlement effects, ideally we would like a
model that includes features of both SUR models
and GARCH models. However, at the present time
such a model does not exist, so we must choose
which type of model works best in this situation.
Since we are most interested in determining whether
a settlement effect exists and since we have other
methods for comparing the size of the effects, we
choose to use a GARCH model because of its benefits
for the estimation of standard errors and t statistics.
Specifically, we chose a GARCH-M model,
where the M denotes that the conditional variance
is included in the mean equation and allows the
conditional variance to provide information about
returns (rate changes in this setting). Then, from
the set of GARCH-M models, we chose the model
proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (GJR)
(1993) because of its definition of the asymmetric
term in the conditional variance. All GARCH-M
models contain an intercept and two prespecified
variables in the variance equation: (i) a trend term
(the ARCH effect) and (ii) a persistence term (the
GARCH effect). The innovation in the GJR-M model
is a third prespecified term that is based on the sign
of the prediction errors (the asymmetric term). This
asymmetric term allows that certain prediction
errors are more important to the market than other
prediction errors. The GJR-M asymmetric term is a
binary dummy variable, which we believe is intui-
tively appealing for the federal funds/LIBOR markets.
In addition, we chose to estimate the GJR-M model
with robust errors to calculate properly the t statis-
tics for the model parameter estimates (see Bollerslev
and Wooldridge, 1992). 
In the reserve maintenance process, banks typi-
cally have either excess reserves (actual reserves>
required reserves) or short reserves (actual reserves<
required reserves) and the period-ending excess or
short position carries forward as the starting reserve
position in the next reserve maintenance period.
Excess reserves are an opportunity cost for the bank
because it could have invested the excess but did
not. Conversely, short reserves indicate that the bank
has invested federal funds using an interest-free
loan from the Federal Reserve. Thus, a clear asym-
metry exists, which we believe makes the dummy
variable definition for the asymmetric term in the
GJR-M model appropriate.
We also tested two other specifications of
GARCH-M to ensure that our results were not an
artifact of our model choice. The other models are
the EGARCH-M specification suggested by Nelson
(1991), with two different specifications of the error
term in the mean equation: (i) a normal distribution
of errors and (ii) a generalized error distribution.
The results from these specifications are qualitatively
similar to the results reported below.13 They are
omitted here for brevity, but are available upon
request.
Cyree and Winters (2001) examine closing fed-
eral funds rates in a GARCH-M model and find signifi-
cant ARCH/GARCH effects. They suggest that these
ARCH/GARCH effects are consistent with the Spindt
and Hoffmeister (1988) model of daily federal funds
rate variances. Cyree and Winters do not find a sig-
nificant mean effect for the conditional variance in
federal funds rate changes. However, we include
the conditional variance in the mean equation for
the spread changes we examine to allow for the
possibility that the conditional variance provides
information about daily spread changes, thus ensur-
ing that we have properly isolated the daily settle-
ment effects in the spreads.
We start our model by putting equations (1)
and (2) in the GARCH-M model developed by GJR
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13 We tested the specification of our GJR-M model against the EGARCH-M
models using likelihood ratio tests and found no significant difference
between the models. Accordingly, we chose to report the GJR-M model
results because of the intuitive appeal of the model relative to the
incentives created by the Federal Reserve settlement rules. In addition,
we performed the Box-Ljung Q-test on the residuals and squared
residuals. In all cases, the residuals are negatively serially correlated,
as expected, and the inclusion of lagged rate changes in the model
does not remove the serial correlation. Also, including lagged rate
changes in the model does not alter the interpretation (i.e., the quali-
tative values or significance) of the daily dummy variables. We note
that Hamilton (1996) concludes that banks do not view reserves from
different days as perfect substitutes, so we chose to use a model speci-
fication without lagged rate changes because we believe this best fits
the economic realities of the federal funds market and its substitute
markets for overnight money.
12 See Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992) for a review of the finance
literature using GARCH models.(1993).14 We extend equations (1) and (2) to include
controls for quarter-ends (see Hamilton, 1996), and
we remove the change in T-bill yields from the
mean equation.15 We estimate our GARCH-M model
with all the daily dummy variables in equations (1)
and (2) and find results that are generally consistent
with previous empirical results and with our expec-
tations for LIBOR. However, we note that the model
becomes difficult to converge and the results are
very sensitive to starting point inputs. We believe
the difficulties lie in the large number of dummy
variable parameter estimates required when we
use all the dummy variables. Furthermore, we have
argued that settlement Wednesday is the one day
that is unique to the U.S. bank settlement process,
so we modify our model to reduce the number of
dummy variables in the model. The new model
converges easily and is not as sensitive to starting
point inputs, yet the results remain consistent with
the full-model empirical results, with previous empir-
ical results in the literature, and with expectations.
The model used to generate the results reported in
the tables is as follows:
The GJR-M mean equation is:
(3) 
where ∆Spdt is the first difference in the daily spread
on day t and the spread is defined as the rate on
the overnight instrument minus the yield on three-
month T-bills16; 1stFriday is a 0/1 dummy variable
∆Spd a a stFriday a ndFriday










that equals 1 on the first Friday of each reserve main-
tenance period and 0 otherwise; 2ndFriday is a 0/1
dummy variable that equals 1 on the second Friday
of each reserve maintenance period and 0 otherwise;
SetWednesday is a 0/1 dummy variable that equals
1 on settlement Wednesday and 0 otherwise; QTR
is a 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the last
trading day of each quarter and 0 otherwise; σt
2 is
the conditional variance (volatility-in-mean term).
Note that in dummy variable regression models
with omitted dummy variables, the parameter esti-
mates of the remaining dummy variables are relative
to the average of the omitted dummy variables.
Fridays have falling rates, so we chose to keep the
two Friday dummy variables in the model so that any
model bias from omitting some dummy variables
would be against finding a settlement Wednesday
effect in the mean equation. The conditional vari-
ance equation for the GJR-M model is
(4)
where It is a 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 if
the lagged error is negative and 0 otherwise. The
indicator variable accounts for asymmetry in the
conditional variance equation as the addition to
the variance based on the sign of last period’s error.
Note that in equation (4) the daily dummy vari-
ables and quarter-end dummy variable are contem-
poraneous with the conditional variance (which is
not common in a GARCH model). This is important
(and appropriate) in the daily dummy variables
because the daily variances created by the settle-
ment rules are conditioned by the day of the reserve
maintenance period. Similarly, the quarter-end
dummy variable is contemporaneous because, as
Hamilton (1996) shows, there are significant quarter-
end conditioning effects on the daily variance.
Summary Statistics on Daily Spreads
Table 1 shows the mean (median) spreads for
the overnight rates relative to three-month T-bill
yields for both the entire sample period and the
subsample period after the reserve requirement
reduction. Note that only after the reserve require-
ment change are Eurocurrency liabilities a substitute
funding source for federal funds in the settlement
process. In addition to these summary statistics, we
conducted various mean difference tests. We find
that each average spread is significantly lower (at
the 1 percent level) after the reserve reduction. In
σε σ ε tt t t t b b b b I c stFriday














MARCH/APRIL 2003      39
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Cyree, Griffiths, Winters
14 GJR uses non-standard GARCH-M notation. We chose to present our
model using standard GARCH(1,1)-M notation as in Chou, Engle, and
Kane (1992), with the addition of the GJR binary asymmetric term in
the conditional variance.
15 Griffiths and Winters (1997) include the change in T-bill yields as a
proxy for the change in the general level of short-term interest rates.
We attempted to include the change in T-bill yields as an explanatory
variable in the mean equation, but very inconsistent parameter esti-
mates on T-bill yields across federal funds, repos, and LIBOR lead us to
remove T-bill yields from the explanatory variables in the mean equa-
tion. Note, T-bills still appear as the base rate in the spreads used as the
dependent variable. Also note that equation (4) cannot include a T-bill
variable as an explanatory variable because T-bill yields are part of the
dependent variable in equation (3); thus, including T-bill yields in
equation (4) would create a contemporaneous endogenous variable,
which is not allowed in the conditional variance of a GARCH model.
16 While we are directly interested in the rate change behavior of our
test rates, we define the dependent variable in terms of a spread to
prevent any general trends in the levels of rates from affecting our
results. An alternative to using T-bill yields as the base rate would be
to use the daily average rate for federal funds, repos, and LIBOR as the
base rate. This could be done for federal funds by using the effective
federal funds rate. However, we know of no source for daily average
repo rates or for daily average LIBOR, so we chose to stay with T-bill
yields as our base rate.the period after the reserve reduction, we find that
the average repo and LIBOR spreads are not different
from each other, but that both are significantly higher
(at the 1 percent level) than the average federal funds
spread. Thus, after the implicit reserve tax was
removed, the spread on LIBOR is similar to the spread
on government repos—making the LIBOR-based
liabilities a viable alternative to repos as a substitute
for federal funds, as would be expected from the law
of one price. Based on the average spreads, the sub-
stitute funding sources are not an attractive alterna-
tive to federal funds. However, the rate comparison
may be very different on settlement Wednesdays.
RESULTS
This section presents our empirical results. The
focus of our tests is to investigate overnight LIBOR
spreads for U.S. settlement effects. However, before
we can investigate LIBOR spreads we must first test
for the presence of a settlement effect in federal
funds spreads (the primary funding source) and
overnight government repo spreads (the domestic
substitute funding source) across our sample period.
Accordingly, we begin our settlement effect tests
on federal funds spreads. We follow federal funds
with tests on overnight repos, and we conclude with
tests on overnight LIBOR.
Federal Funds
We begin our analysis by estimating our
GARCH-M model on the daily change in federal
funds spreads. We divide our sample into two sub-
samples: before and after the lifting of the reserve
requirement on Eurocurrency liabilities. The 3 per-
cent reserve regime ended with the maintenance
period that closed December 12, 1990, and the 0
percent regime began with the maintenance period
that opened December 27, 1990. The purpose of
this analysis of federal funds rates is to determine
whether the previously identified settlement effects
in rate changes and variance appear in federal funds
rates during both subperiods of the our sample. The
results on federal funds are reported in Table 3.
The first column of Table 3 reports results for the
period from August 4, 1986, through December 12,
1990. The mean (spread-change) equation has, in
general, the predicted pattern. That is, spreads fall on
Fridays and rise on settlement Wednesday relative to
average spread. The increase on settlement Wednesday
supports a settlement effect in rate changes. 
The variance equation shows significant ARCH/
GARCH effects, which suggests that daily variances
are conditional. The significant and positive ARCH
effect (ε
2
t–1) suggests trends in the daily variances,
while the significant and positive GARCH effect (σ
2
t–1)
suggests that shocks persist in the daily variances.
Both effects are consistent with the model of daily
federal funds variances by Spindt and Hoffmeister
(1988). The settlement Wednesday parameter esti-
mate is positive and significant at the 1 percent level,
and it is much larger in magnitude than either of
the Friday parameter estimates. This finding is con-
sistent with a settlement effect in the conditional
variance.
These results suggest that the predicted rate
change and variance regularities are present in
federal funds during the subperiod when Euro-
currency liabilities carried a 3 percent reserve
requirement. With these results, it is reasonable to
expect a settlement Wednesday effect in rates on
substitute funding sources. A substitute funding
source for federal funds is a U.S. dollar source of
deposits at the Fed that carries a 0 percent reserve
requirement and, thus, through the law of one price
should cost a bank approximately the same interest
rate as federal funds. During the period with the 3
percent reserve requirement on Eurocurrency liabili-
ties, government repos were a substitute for federal
funds but Eurocurrency liabilities were not. So,
during this time period we would expect to find a
settlement Wednesday effect in overnight govern-
ment repo rates, but not in LIBOR.
The third column of Table 3 presents the param-
eter estimates from our GARCH-M model for federal
funds during the subperiod from February 7, 1991,
through January 31, 1995. Beginning this subperiod
on February 7, 1991, removes the first three reserve
maintenance periods under the new rules from
our analysis. This allows the market a little time to
adjust to the new rules. Feinman (1993) notes, in
fact, that substantial volatility occurred with the
change to the new rules. Also, the manager of the
federal funds trading desk of a large regional bank
has said that it took banks several weeks to adjust
to the new rules. Accordingly, we believe that remov-
ing the first three reserve maintenance periods, while
clearly arbitrary, is reasonable.17
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17 Including these periods prevents our GARCH-M model from converg-
ing for federal funds due to the unusual volatility during this six-week
period. Using other methods that allow us to include the six-week
period, we find qualitatively similar results to our GARCH results
excluding the six weeks. These results are omitted for brevity, but are
available upon request. Because we anticipate daily heteroskedasticity,
we believe a GARCH model is the best method for our tests. The spread change results on Fridays and settle-
ment Wednesday are consistent with the predicted
pattern and consistent with the results from the
earlier subperiod. The variance equation shows
significant ARCH/GARCH effects.18 The variance
equation also shows a settlement Wednesday param-
eter estimate that is positive and significant at the
1 percent level and substantially larger than the
Friday parameter estimates. This finding is consis-
tent with expectations and the results from the
previous subperiod and is consistent with Feinman’s
(1993) observation of increased variance after the
reserve reduction.
These results suggest that the predicted pattern
is present in the later subperiod. Again, this means
we would expect to find a settlement Wednesday
effect in rates of substitute funding sources.
Overnight Government Repos
Table 4 presents the results from estimating
our GARCH-M model on overnight government
repos. Government repos are a substitute funding
source for federal funds in the settlement process
across our entire sample period. Accordingly, we
expect to find settlement effects in overnight govern-
ment repo rate changes and variances across our
entire sample period. It is important to identify a
settlement effect in a substitute funding source
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8/4/86–12/12/90 2/7/91–1/31/95
Variable Estimate t statistic Estimate t statistic
Mean equation
Intercept –0.0015 –0.31 0.0219*** 3.74
1stFriday –0.0382** –2.45 –0.1263*** –9.34
2ndFriday –0.0689*** –4.59 –0.0803*** –8.17
SetWednesday 0.1315*** 5.34 0.0840** 2.24
QTR 0.0957 1.30 0.1281** 2.05
σt
2 0.0600** 2.13 –0.1058*** –3.26
Variance equation
Intercept 0.0284*** 43.16 0.2088*** 4.98
ε
2
t–1 0.0194** 2.22 0.4357*** 6.28
σ
2
t–1 0.8980*** 35.03 0.6459*** 11.51
ε
2
t–1It –0.7211*** –26.89 0.1877 1.41
1stFriday –0.0187*** –10.47 –0.0356*** –2.68
2ndFriday –0.0031 –1.26 –0.0170** –1.95
SetWednesday 0.3609*** 6.74 0.3686*** 3.70
QTR 0.1145** 2.23 0.7416* 1.85
NOTE: This table reports the results for estimating the GARCH-M model on the spread of the overnight federal funds rate relative to
the closing three-month T-bill rates. The model is estimated twice. The first estimation is for the period from 8/4/86 through 12/12/90
when the reserve requirement for Eurocurrency liabilities is 3 percent. The second estimation is for the period from 2/7/91 through
1/31/95 when the reserve requirement for Eurocurrency liabilities is 0 percent. The mean equation for the GARCH-M model is
∆Spdt=a0+a11stFriday+a22ndFriday+a3SetWednesday+a4QTR +λσt
2+εt.








*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels.
Table 3
18 Note that the sum of the ARCH and GARCH parameter estimates is
greater than 1, which is usually considered a sign of an estimation
error because it suggests that the conditional variance grows rapidly.
However, during this time period, federal funds rates are much more
volatile than during the earlier sample, with settlement Wednesday
volatility being extremely high. Accordingly, we believe these estimates
are reasonable.across the entire period for comparison with Euro-
currency liabilities, which only became a substitute
in the latter part of the sample period. The first
column of Table 4 reports the results from the sub-
period when Eurocurrency liabilities carried a 3
percent reserve requirement, and the third column
of Table 4 reports the results from the subperiod
with no reserve requirement.
The first set of results shows a negative and
significant estimate at the 1 percent level for the
first Friday and a positive and significant estimate
at the 5 percent level for settlement Wednesday.
The variance results indicate significant and positive
ARCH/GARCH effects, which are consistent with the
results for federal funds. Both Fridays and settlement
Wednesday contribute significantly to the condi-
tional variance. The settlement Wednesday param-
eter estimate is positive and about five times larger
than the Friday parameters. These results are con-
sistent with the existence of settlement effects in a
substitute funding source during the subperiod
with the 3 percent reserve requirement.
The second set of results on overnight govern-
ment repos shows strong evidence of the predicted
spread change effects with significant (1 percent
level) and negative spread changes on Fridays and
a significant (1 percent level) and positive spread
change on settlement Wednesday. The variance
equation shows significant and positive ARCH/
GARCH effects. As with the results on repos for the
earlier subperiod, settlement Wednesday provides
a significant (1 percent level) and positive contribu-
tion to the conditional variance and its parameter
estimate is substantially larger (about three times)
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Overnight Government Repo GARCH Model Results
8/4/86–12/12/90 2/7/91–1/31/95
Variable Estimate t statistic Estimate t statistic
Mean equation
Intercept –0.0082* –1.75 –0.0011 –0.19
1stFriday –0.0368*** –3.01 –0.0876*** –5.89
2ndFriday –0.0224 –1.28 –0.0622*** –5.53
SetWednesday 0.0540** 2.00 0.0603*** 2.73
QTR 0.0385 0.58 0.1589 1.64
σt
2 0.4502*** 5.25 0.0094 0.11
Variance equation
Intercept 0.0102*** 25.62 0.0264*** 32.26
ε
2
t–1 0.2835*** 1.51 0.0433*** 2.68
σ
2
t–1 0.3471*** 15.28 0.4732*** 18.62
ε
2
t–1It –0.2591*** –10.46 –0.3917*** –14.14
1stFriday –0.0100*** –7.05 –0.0143*** –6.88
2ndFriday 0.0128*** 3.47 –0.0159*** –8.51
SetWednesday 0.0627*** 13.53 0.0453*** 7.27
QTR 0.0698*** 3.73 0.1805** 2.52
NOTE: This table reports the results for estimating the GARCH-M model on the spread of the overnight government repo rate relative
to the closing three-month T-bill rates. The model is estimated twice. The first estimation is for the period from 8/4/86 through 12/12/90
when the reserve requirement for Eurocurrency liabilities is 3 percent. The second estimation is for the period from 2/7/91 through
1/31/95 when the reserve requirement for Eurocurrency liabilities is 0 percent. The mean equation for the GARCH-M model is
∆Spdt=a0+a11stFriday+a22ndFriday+a3SetWednesday+a4QTR +λσt
2+εt.








*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels.
Table 4than the parameter estimates on Fridays. These
results show settlement effects in a substitute fund-
ing source during the subperiod with the 0 percent
reserve requirement.
LIBOR 
To this point, we have shown that the Fed’s settle-
ment regulations influence spread changes and
variance in the primary funding source (federal
funds) and in the domestic substitute funding source
(government repos). In this subsection, we explore
the hypothesis that LIBOR spreads become influ-
enced by Fed settlement regulations when Euro-
currency liabilities become a substitute funding
source for federal funds through the reduction in
the reserve requirement to 0 percent. Again, we
remind the reader that only vault cash and deposits
at the Fed can be used for settlement; therefore, a
comparable substitute for federal funds would need
to be a source of overnight U.S. dollar deposits at
the Fed with a 0 percent reserve requirement, which,
through the law of one price, should carry approxi-
mately the same interest rate as federal funds.
Table 5 presents the results from estimating
our GARCH-M model on overnight LIBOR spreads.
The first column reports the results from the sub-
period with a 3 percent reserve requirement, and
the third column reports the results from the sub-
period with the 0 percent reserve requirement on
Eurocurrency liabilities. In this formulation, we
switch to the 11:00 a.m. quote for three-month
Treasury bill rates. This allows for a time-consistent
spread for (closing) overnight LIBOR rate quotes
from the U.K. market relative to the relevant T-bill
quote.
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8/4/86–12/12/90 2/7/91–1/31/95
Variable Estimate t statistic Estimate t statistic
Mean equation
Intercept –0.0001 –0.03 0.0177*** 4.96
1stFriday 0.0028 0.25 –0.0791*** –8.01
2ndFriday 0.0148 1.03 –0.0217*** –2.61
SetWednesday –0.0163 –1.50 0.0368** 2.54
QTR 0.0303 0.56 0.0876 1.24
σt
2 0.0693 0.98 –0.5458*** –5.61
Variance equation
Intercept 0.0030*** 22.27 0.0132*** 54.60
ε
2
t–1 0.5360*** 96.37 0.0821*** 8.26
σ
2
t–1 0.4442*** 27.51 0.4504*** 17.39
ε
2
t–1It –0.0514** –2.18 –0.2533*** –6.20
1stFriday 0.0004 0.27 –0.0025*** –2.67
2ndFriday 0.0235*** 12.79 –0.0087*** –12.18
SetWednesday 0.0045*** 2.79 0.0251*** 9.30
QTR 0.0465*** 3.04 0.0954** 2.16
NOTE: This table reports the results for estimating the GARCH-M model on the spread of the overnight LIBOR rate relative to the
closing three-month T-bill rates. The model is estimated twice. The first estimation is for the period from 8/4/86 through 12/12/90
when the reserve requirement for Eurocurrency liabilities is 3 percent. The second estimation is for the period from 2/7/91 through
1/31/95 when the reserve requirement for Eurocurrency liabilities is 0 percent. The mean equation for the GARCH-M model is
∆Spdt=a0+a11stFriday+a22ndFriday+a3SetWednesday+a4QTR +λσt
2+εt.








*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels.
Table 5The first set of results shows no evidence of
the settlement effects found for federal funds and
overnight government repos during this subperiod
when Eurocurrency liabilities were not a substitute
funding source. Specifically, there is no significant
spread increase on settlement Wednesday and settle-
ment Wednesday is not the largest daily contribution
to the conditional variance. These results suggest
that, during the time period when Eurocurrency
liabilities carried a reserve tax, banks did not use
Eurocurrency liabilities in managing their reserve
accounts.
The second set of results shows strong evidence
of settlement effects. Specifically, the spread changes
in the mean equation show a significantly positive
settlement Wednesday effect. The variance equation
shows significant and positive ARCH/GARCH effects.
Settlement Wednesday provides a positive and sig-
nificant (1 percent level) contribution to the condi-
tional variance, with its parameter estimate being
about three times larger than the parameter esti-
mates on Fridays. These results are consistent with
the results from federal funds and overnight govern-
ment repos from the same subperiod, which suggests
that during this period U.S. banks did become the
marginal borrower in dollar-based Eurocurrency lia-
bilities as they managed their reserve accounts on
settlement Wednesdays.
The results for LIBOR in the first subperiod are
clearly different from those in the second subperiod.
With significant settlement effects in the latter
period, the combination of LIBOR results suggests
that the change in the reserve requirements on
Eurocurrency liabilities had a significant impact on
the overnight money markets in London. 
The Size of Settlement Wednesday
At this point, we have shown that after the
reserve reduction on Eurocurrency liabilities the
average federal funds spread is significantly smaller
than the average spreads on the substitute funding
sources and that settlement Wednesday effects in
spread changes exist in each asset. In this section,
we discuss the size of the settlement Wednesday
spread change in each instrument after the reserve
reduction and the appropriate implications. Recall
that the timing of the LIBOR results aligns with the
late morning in the U.S. and that Griffiths and
Winters (1995) show that the majority of the settle-
ment Wednesday effect appears in the afternoon.
So, since the London market closes in late morning,
one would not anticipate the same magnitude of
spread changes in the London market as in the
domestic markets.
To address the size of the settlement Wednesday
spread change effect, we calculate the average
spread change on each funding source on settlement
Wednesday.19 We find the following average spread
changes on settlement Wednesdays after the reserve
reduction: (i) a 24-basis-point increase for federal
funds, (ii) a 15-basis-point increase for overnight
government repos, and (iii) an 8-basis-point increase
in overnight LIBOR.
These findings are consistent with our expecta-
tions for the following reasons. First, the primary
funding source should have the largest increase
because it is, on average, the cheapest and most
convenient source of funds (because banks are
already regular and active participants in federal
funds trading) and thus should be the focus of the
settlement Wednesday rate pressure. Second, the
rate pressure should be greater in overnight repo
rates than overnight LIBOR because of the timing
of the two markets: The brokered repo market is
active during the afternoon in the United States,
while the London LIBOR-based Eurocurrency market
is closed. Thus, overnight repo rates are open to the
significant rate pressures of settlement Wednesday
afternoons while overnight LIBOR is not.
Control Variables
There are results from some of the control
variables that deserve a brief discussion. We have
delayed the discussion until this point to avoid
detracting from the primary focus of the paper,
which is the pervasiveness of the Federal Reserve
settlement regulations.
Quarter-ends exhibit significant and positive
contributions to the conditional variances across
all instruments in this study and across both sample
subperiods. However, only one of six quarter-end
parameter estimates in the mean equations is signifi-
cant. This combination of results suggests uncer-
tainty in these markets at quarter-ends without a
consistent increase or decrease in rate pressure.
This finding suggests a great deal of funds movement
at quarter-end without squeezes or shortages.
The asymmetric term in the conditional variance
is significant and negative in five of six estimates.
The one exception is for federal funds in the latter
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19 We cannot directly use the parameter estimates reported from the
GARCH-M model because the spread change equation includes a
conditional variance effect.period, which was unusually volatile. A significant
parameter estimate suggests that some errors are
more important to the market than other errors, and
a negative parameter estimate suggests a reduction
in the conditional variance. A negative parameter
estimate from our specification of the asymmetric
term suggests that, when the actual rate is less than
the rate the market expected, conditional variance
declines.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine overnight LIBOR
around the change by the Federal Reserve in the
reserve requirement on Eurocurrency liabilities
from 3 percent to 0 percent. The change in the
reserve requirement eliminates the reserve tax on
Eurocurrency liabilities and thus allows the law of
one price to make Eurocurrency liabilities a viable
alternative funding source for federal funds for
banks in managing their reserve accounts. We find
no evidence of settlement Wednesday effects in
LIBOR during the period of the 3 percent reserve
requirement, but we find strong evidence of settle-
ment Wednesday effects in LIBOR during the period
of the 0 percent reserve requirement. Our results
suggest that, when Eurocurrency liabilities are a
substitute funding source for federal funds, banks
use them in managing their reserve accounts—
becoming the marginal borrower on settlement
Wednesdays. In contrast, when Eurocurrency lia-
bilities carry a reserve tax, banks use other funding
sources in managing their reserve accounts.
Our results suggest the following: Overnight
money markets are global and the micromechanics
of one market can spillover into another market
and, in this case, carry the effects of Federal
Reserve settlement rules into off-shore markets.
That is, we demonstrate that changes in Fed policy
allowing Eurocurrency liabilities to be a substitute
funding source in the settlement process results in
LIBOR being affected by the Fed’s bank settlement
procedures. 
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